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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years, violence and public housing have been closely linked in 
political and popular cultures.  To many, public housing symbolizes the dangers 
of inner city urban life. Built mainly in the 1950s and 1960s to assist the poor and 
working poor to escape “slum” conditions, most housing projects are clusters of 
high rise towers that were placed in neighborhoods already in the midst of 
significant social structural change. More recently, public housing design began to 
include low slung garden apartments, but these also were built in neighborhoods 
that traditionally were “slums” with high concentrations of many of the correlates 
of violence.   
 In the years following the Second World War, crime rates in 
neighborhoods with public housing sites had begun climbing, and rapid 
population change and economic decline had changed the fortunes of 
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neighborhood residents for theworse. 1 In the last 20 years, the notion that public 
housing is, by its physical and social design, a dangerous milieu, has been 
reinforced by rare but widely publicized episodes of youth violence, sequential 
drug epidemics, and elevated rates of drug-related violence.  Starting with the 
crack epidemic in the mid-1980s, the high rise towers of large, isolated, and 
ominous public housing projects came to symbolize societal drug and crime 
problems.  Recent studies suggest that base rates of victimization and violent 
offending are higher in public housing compared to other contexts, and that these 
problems can be attributed in part to drug use and selling.2 
 The intense activity in Chicago public housing by drug gangs,3 and its 
takeover in 1995 by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
4 reinforced these images of public housing.  Recent law and policy focusing drug 
control policies on public housing has reinforced the connections between public 
housing, crime and drugs.5 These connections are routinely revisited in the press 
as a reminder of the persistence of drug problems in public housing.6 
 In response to these problems in large cities nationwide, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched the Drug 
Elimination Program (DEP).  DEP funds were available only to public housing 
authorities to address drug problems.  Drug problems included drug selling, drug 
use, and drug-related violence. The program was flexible and diverse, a reflection 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Alex Kotlowitz, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE (1990); Nicholas Lemann, 
THE PROMISED LAND (1991).  Also, see earlier sociological works by Lee Rainwater, BEHIND 
GHETTO WALLS (1966), Ulf Hannerz, SOULSIDE (1969), and James Garbarino, CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT (1992).   
2 Timothy Ireland et al., Violence Among Adolescents Living In Public Housing: A Two-Site 
Analysis, 3 Criminology and Public Policy 3 (2003); Susan Popkin, et al., THE HIDDEN WAR: 
THE BATTLE TO CONTROL CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (2000); Tamara Dumanovsky et 
al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in New York City’s Public Housing, Presented at the 
September Research Institute on Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families, Joint Center for 
Poverty Research, The University of Chicago and Northwestern University (1999).  Recent efforts 
by HUD to conduct victimization surveys in public housing projects suggest elevated rates, but 
with a host of methodological artifacts and complexities.  See, for example, Harold R Holzman 
and Lanny Piper, Measuring Crime in Public Housing: Methodological Issues and Research 
Strategies, 14 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 331 (1998); Harold R Holzman, 
Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better Understanding of People, Places 
and Spaces, 42 Crime and Delinquency  361 (1996). 
3  See, for example, Sudhir Alli Venkatesh, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN 
AMERICAN GHETTO (2000). 
4 Judy A. England-Joseph, HUD's takeover of the Chicago Housing Authority, statement to the 
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, House of Representatives, 1995. 
5 See, for example, HUD v Rucker, infra note 23; The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section 
5101), infra note 21. 
6 See, for example, N.R. Kleinfeld, With Drugs in Open, Elderly Live Behind Locks, New York 
Times, May 2, 2004, at 41 (describing drugs and violence in Harborview Terrace Houses on the 
west side of Manhattan, primarily by illegal tenants in a housing complex with a high proportion 
of elderly residents). 
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of the different needs and strengths of the local housing authorities. At its core, 
DEP combined several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent and 
control drug use: police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention, 
coordination of services with health and social service agencies, and development 
of the social infrastructure of formal and informal supervision groups in the 
housing authorities. 
The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) launched its local DEP 
program in 1990 to reduce drug use, drug selling, and drug-related crimes in 
public housing sites. The local programs are collaborations between NYCHA 
management and local tenant organizations and residents to design and implement 
DEP activities.  Supported activities include enhanced police protection, drug 
treatment, drug prevention programs, youth and gang outreach, and community 
organizing.  Capital projects also are supported by DEP, such as lighting 
improvements and installation of CCTV surveillance. Programs have been present 
in more than 85% of the sites for one or more years since the program’s inception 
in 1991, and funding reached $40 million in 1996. NYCHA has spent over $165 
million on DEP over its seven years. 
Despite this large investment, there has been surprisingly little research on 
DEP efforts in New York City, or in DEP sites nationally.9   More generally, 
research on drug and crime control efforts in public housing is very limited,10 and 
only rarely tied to specific policy frameworks.11 The contradiction between the 
severity of drug and crime problems in public housing and the relatively sparse 
literature has left an important gap on the effects of drug control strategies in 
public housing, neighborhoods and other small social areas.   
NYCHA=s 344 projects provide a rich context for testing drug control 
policies such as DEP.  In this study, we examine the effects of the DEP 
intervention at three levels of complementary theoretical relevance: the public 
housing development itself, the neighborhood in which public housing is situated, 
and the police precinct where the tract is located.  We begin with a description of 
the DEP Program as implemented in New York City, and then examine the 





                                                 
9 Terence Dunworth and Aaron Saiger. Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource 
Document, Executive Summary.  Washington DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (1994). 
10 Susan Popkin, et al., The Hidden War, supra note 2. 
11 In contrast, see: Anthony Braga, et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A 
Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 Criminology 541-580 (1999). 
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II.  THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY 
NYCHA is by far the nation=s largest housing authority,7 with an official 
population of over 600,000 residents in 344 public housing developments.8  With 
over 179,000 units, public housing constitutes approximately 8.5% of all rental 
housing in New York City.  Most (65%) of the city=s public housing 
developments were built before 1970.  Most developments are large: only 9% 
have fewer than 100 units.  Most of these smaller developments were built after 
1970.  In contrast, thirty-three percent of all public housing developments in New 
York City have more than 1,000 units.  
Public housing is not randomly distributed across the five boroughs of 
New York City, nor is it randomly sited in the city’s neighborhoods.  Over eighty-
five percent of all public housing in the city is in three boroughs: Brooklyn, 
Manhattan and the Bronx.  Although dispersed outside the commercial center in 
Manhattan, public housing is spread across most (53) of the city’s 75 police 
precincts. This distribution reflects, in part, the decisions on where to locate 
public housing and the success of locally organized opposition in the wealthier 
neighborhoods. For example, only a few public housing developments were 
constructed in Queens, a largely middle class, residential area, and the largest 
cluster of public housing in Queens is in the Rockaways C on the ocean side of 
Kennedy Airport C an area that is geographically much closer to Brooklyn than to 
the center of Queens.  Staten Island has only ten public housing developments, 
and these are concentrated in the borough=s densely populated North Shore, near 
the ferry terminal.  
In Manhattan, most developments are located above 110th St. or below 
midtown on the Lower East Side, well removed from the city’s wealthiest 
neighborhoods and its commercial centers.  Brooklyn has the most public housing 
in the city, with the largest concentrations in the heavily minority neighborhoods 
of Brownsville, Bushwick and East New York. Particularly for the larger 
developments in the “outer boroughs,” such as Queensbridge, Morrisania or 
                                                 
7 In comparison, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) administers 40,462 units.  After these, the 
largest PHAs include Philadelphia with 22,229 units; Baltimore with 17,119; and Boston with 
14,400 units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Authority Profiles).   
8 Official population counts of public housing residents tend to undercount the total number of 
people living in public housing at any given time.  Tenants are required to register family and 
income information with the Housing Authority annually.  These figures are used to confirm 
eligibility for public housing, and in some cases are used to determine rents.  Because of these 
administrative guidelines, tenants do not always report all household members to the Housing 
Authority.  These Aunofficial@ residents may be family members or friends moving in for an 
extended period, or men living in otherwise female-headed single-parent families.  This 
complicates analyses that rely on these official statistics.  Comparing 1980 and 1990 census 
population numbers with NYCHA tenant counts for public housing developments whose 
boundaries correspond to census block groups shows that official population numbers are 
consistently lower than census numbers B on average, NYCHA population numbers were up to 
30% lower than census counts. 
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Brownsville, public housing tends to ecologically dominate the surrounding areas, 
suggesting that some areas are “public housing neighborhoods.” 
Table 1 shows that public housing developments are sited in census tracts 
with higher crime rates than other areas. The average annual homicide count from 
1985-96 in census tracts with public housing projects is more than three times 
higher (1.87 per year) compared to tracts without public housing.9  Figure 1 
shows that homicide rates were persistently higher over time in tracts with public 
housing, and remained higher in 1996, after the city’s overall rates had sharply 
declined.  
Table 1 also shows the extent of social disadvantage in tracts with public 
housing sites.  Compared to non-public housing tracts, these census tracts have 
higher rates of households receiving public assistance, households below the 
poverty level, female headed households with children, renters, and minority 
population.  They tend to have fewer high school graduates, persons in managerial 
or professional jobs, and persons working or in the labor force. They are more 
racially heterogeneous, and their population density is greater. 
Table 2 shows the size and characteristics of public housing developments 
for the period from 1985-96, the years when we had detailed information on 
tenant characteristics.  The total population has declined in recent years, but has 
remained poor and non-white.  Household density has declined slightly, but the 
percentage of seniors and children below 10 years of age has increased.  The 
percentage of families on welfare has grown, as has the average duration of 
residency.  This suggests stability in the population, although at a rate where 
households have fewer resources that would help them eventually move to other 
housing contexts.  With more children per household and long durations of public 
housing tenancy, it seems unlikely that the social or human ecology of public 
housing will change in the near future. 
 
 
III.  THE DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM 
 
 NYCHA first sought DEP funds from HUD in 1989, and a small pilot 
program was funded in 1990.  A far larger program was supported starting in 
1991; by 1995, DEP was present in most of the public housing developments in 
New York City.  Funding levels for the various components of DEP are shown in 
detail in Table 3, and are summarized in broader categories in Table 4. 
 The primary goal of DEP was to reduce drug use, drug selling, drug-
related crime and collateral crime problems by strengthening both formal and 
informal social control in public housing developments.  Increased police 
presence and targeted prosecutions were the mechanisms to increase formal social 
control. The primary public security program was Operation Safe Home (OSH).  
                                                 
9 The rates per 1,000 persons are .41 in tracts with public housing and .19 in tracts without public 
housing. 
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OSH created intensive patrols in and around public housing sites, while the Anti-
Narcotics Strike Force (ANSF) received grant funds to support special 
prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with drug arrests. For the first two 
years, slightly less than one dollar in three went to police patrols, through OSH.  
By the third year, almost half the budget was allocated to OSH; by 1995, more 
than half the funds went to OSH.  ANSF funding was modest but stable 
throughout the study period, but remained a fraction of the law enforcement 
budget. 
 Stronger tenant organizations and increased resident patrols were the 
primary strategies to strengthen informal social control. NYCHA tenant 
organizations were encouraged to become active in producing security through 
the creation of Drug Elimination Committees, Tenant Patrols, and Community 
Center Programs.  Over the years, DEP also offered services and programs to 
address issues more indirectly related to the reduction of drug-related crime, such 
as a Domestic Violence Program, a Career Training Program, and arts and sports 
activities.  
  The percentage of the program allocated to demand reduction programs 
dropped sharply beginning in 1994, as program funding more than doubled.  Drug 
abuse treatment and prevention services received a declining share of the budget 
over the course of DEP, from more than one third of the 1991 budget to less than 
three percent in 1996.  The decline is striking, from $5 million in 1991 to about $1 
million in 1996.  Tenant patrols, designed to engage residents of public housing in 
the co-production of security, were modestly but stably funded throughout the 
program.  But the share of total DEP funds allocated to tenant patrols also 
dropped sharply as the program grew in 1994. Social and community services 
rose in 1994 as the program expanded, although these funds were diffused across 
14 separate categories.  When spread across the NYCHA system, the funded 
amounts per development were inconsequential. 
 The expansion of DEP in 1994, and the sharp shift in funding priorities to 
strengthen OSH, reflects broader shifts in law enforcement strategy and social 
policy in New York City in 1994, following a change in mayoral administration. 
The emphasis on street-level enforcement in New York City has been widely 
described10 and analyzed.11  The budget trends reflect not just the shift in policy 
choices; there were substantive changes in strategy, tactics, and policing style 
beginning in this time that provoked strong public reactions, and raised 
contentious claims about the role of policing to bring about citywide crime 
                                                 
10 See, for example, William Bratton and Peter Knobler, TURNAROUND (1998); Judith A Greene, 
Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 Crime and 
Delinquency 171 (1999). 
11 George Kelling and Catherine Cole, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS (1996); New York State 
Attorney General, Stop and Frisk Report, 1999; Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and 
Broken Windows: Terry Race, and Disorder in  New York City, 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
457 (2000). 
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reductions.12  Declining investments in drug abuse treatment and prevention was 
part of this administration’s generalized social policy shift and theoretical re-
orientation that de-emphasized demand reduction strategies.13 
 Below, we describe details of the major components of DEP: Operation 
Safe Homes, the ANSF, Tenant Patrols, and Drug Treatment.14   
 
A.  Operation Safe Home 
  
 Operation Safe Home (OSH) was considered the “linchpin” of NYCHA’s 
Drug Elimination Program.15  OSH focused on increasing the presence of 
uniformed officers and law enforcement activities in public housing developments 
with the goal of providing a more secure living environment for its residents by 
combating serious crime.  The program emphasized “vertical patrols” in public 
housing to clear problem areas, and subsequent maintenance to keep areas safe.  
OSH teams patrolled indoor and outdoor areas, conducted systematic building 
patrols – lasting from several weeks to several months – and worked with 
management teams to improve physical security at targeted sites (e.g., repairing 
broken lighting and door locks).  
 For the early part of DEP, OSH involved two separate groups, Target 
Teams and Maintenance Teams.  “Target Teams,” consisting of five officers and 
one sergeant, were deployed to selected developments in an attempt to “take 
back” a development building by building, often conducting vertical patrols in the 
larger buildings.  OSH officers encouraged residents to form tenant patrols, and 
provided training and assistance to these patrols.  Officers also reported any 
instances of  physical damage or vandalism to management staff who were 
expected to attend to the maintenance needs of the target developments.  The 
Target Phase lasted for up to a month and a half, after which a “Maintenance 
Team,” usually two officers, were given periodic patrols at the recently 
“completed” developments.16  Maintenance Teams were responsible for insuring 
that the work of the Target Teams remained effective after they moved on to a 
new development. 
 The number of police officers participating in OSH increased from 48 in 
                                                 
12 Bernard Harcourt, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Andrew Karmen, NEW YORK MURDER 
MYSTERY (2000); Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT (2nd edition) (2000). 
13 At the same time, though, the Courts created and expanded a network of specialized treatment 
courts designed to divert drug offenders from criminal prosecution to substance abuse treatment.  
See, Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, Institutionalizing Innovation: 
The New York Drug Court Story, 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 277 (2000).  But these 
programs was open to all eligible criminal defendants, and public housing residents effectively 
lost their dedicated pathway into drug treatment. 
14  For more detailed descriptions and analyses of the program components, see: Jeffrey Fagan et 
al., Drug Control in Public Housing: The Impact of the Drug Elimination Program of The New 
York City Housing Authority.  Final Report, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, July 2003. 
15  NYCHA DEP Grant Application, 1991. 
16  NYPD Operation Safe Home, 1994 Year End Report. 
 XXX]                            FAGAN, DAVIES AND HOLLAND                                           8 
1991, to 81 in 1994.  Each Police Service Area (PSA)17 was assigned one or two 
Target Teams and one Maintenance Team, giving the area between five and ten 
OSH officers by 1994. In 1995, when the Transit Police and Housing Police were 
merged with the NYPD, OSH grew from 81 officers and nine sergeants, to 400 
officers, with 57 sergeants.18  Following a change in mayoral administration in 
1994, the OSH budget doubled the next year, and increased again by 50% the 
following year. It remained at that level through the end of the decade. 
 
B.  Tenant Patrols 
 
 Through the Tenant Patrol Program, NYCHA involved residents in 
resisting drug-related crime in their developments.  Volunteer residents, under the 
direction of a tenant patrol supervisor, walked the grounds of their public housing 
development in an effort to deter criminal activity.  The tenant patrol supervisors, 
part-time employees of NYCHA, were funded through DEP – and were usually 
former tenant patrol volunteers.  In case of emergency, supervisors had the ability 
to contact local police through the Citywide Telephone Monitoring System.  In 
addition to crime deterrence, the patrol had an “early intervention” component, 
which identified and addressed common maintenance problems like broken lights, 
thermostats, and unclean lobbies.   
 NYCHA envisioned the patrols as the “eyes and ears” of the housing 
police and considered the tenant patrols one of the more important aspects of the 
Drug Elimination Program, in that it helped to create a bridge between the police 
and the community.19  The tenant patrols worked with local police precincts and 
public housing management to identify problem areas on public housing grounds, 
providing a basis for cooperation between residents, NYCHA staff and the local 
police.  As developed under NYCHA DEP, the level of activity of the tenant 
patrols corresponds with that of OSH.  During OSH vertical patrols, recruitment 
efforts for the tenant patrols are increased.   
 NYCHA’s Tenant Patrol Division had 15 staff members.  The staff 
members’ duties included coordinating and conducting training sessions for 
volunteer tenant patrol supervisors, and providing support for the supervisors 
once the patrol was under way.  After the start of DEP, these efforts were 
organized around the OSH interventions.  As OSH expanded, NYCHA found that 
the Tenant Patrol Division staff was not able to keep up with the tenant patrol 
volunteers’ demand for support.   By 1993, tenant patrol volunteers requested that 
each target site have it’s own tenant patrol staff.  In response, subsequent DEP 
budgets included salaries for 20 community coordinators (field associates) and 
supervisory staff.  As a result, the Tenant Patrol Program’s budget expanded 
seven-fold, from $165,000 in 1994 to $1.1 million in 1995. By 1999, the Tenant 
                                                 
17  Under the Housing Authority Police Department, PSAs were administrative units comparable 
to NYPD police precincts.  For example, the South Bronx is PSA 7. 
18  NYPD, Operation Safe Home Report, July 1995. 
19   NYCHA DEP Grant Application, 1995. 
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Patrol Program had 213 part-time (20 hours per week) tenant patrol supervisors, 
working with 6,650 volunteers at 795 buildings; active tenant patrols were in 
place at 144 separate developments. 
 Despite this growth, the budget share for this component of DEP remained 
a small fraction of the total DEP budget, and was dwarfed starting in 1995 by the 
budget for police interventions.  Over the study period, OSH consumed 45.5% of 
the total DEP outlay, compared to 1.8% for tenant patrols. 
 
C.  The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force 
 
 The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force (ANSF) was a team of attorneys, 
investigators and support staff that was created in 1988 within NYCHA’s Law 
Department.  Its focus was the eviction from public housing of persons involved 
in the illegal distribution and sale of narcotics.  
 Prior to 1971, NYCHA could evict tenants with only one month’s notice, 
and without a hearing.  In response to a 1967 challenge to these evictions, 
NYCHA entered into a consent decree which required a multiple-stage review 
process, including legal notice, representation, a NYCHA hearing and appeals, for 
all eviction cases (Escalera vs the New York City Housing Authority, 1971).20 
Recent changes in federal law provided an enabling framework for ANSF 
prosecutions,21 and the law has been strengthened over the decade since DEP was 
created. In 1996, President Clinton announced the “One Strike” policy – 
essentially restating the provisions of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act – to 
encourage public housing authorities to apply the 1988 provisions to speed the 
eviction of residents involved in criminal activity. Also in 1996, a Federal judge 
granted NYCHA the right to use the Bawdy House Law – originally intended to 
allow evictions for vice, particularly prostitution – in cases involving drug 
traffickers.22  Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this provision in the 
case of HUD v. Rucker: a 9th Circuit case involving the eviction of a 63-year old 
                                                 
20 Pedro and Rose Escalera were tenants in New York City public housing. They filed a class 
action in 1967 under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against NYCHA, alleging 
violations of the  Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the United States Housing Act 
of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401. Before trial, the parties entered into settlement which 
later was incorporated into a decree, known as the “Escalera Decree,” Escalera v. New York City 
Housing. Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970). 
21 The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section 5101) strengthened existing public housing 
lease provisions by including language in the leases to the effect that: “A public housing resident, 
any member of the resident’s household, or a guest or other person under the resident’s control 
shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or near public 
housing premises . . . and such criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy” (HUD, 
April 1991).  A resident does not need to be convicted of criminal activity to be considered in 
violation of Section 5101.   
22 N.Y.McKinney's RPAPL §§ 711 and 715.  See, Valerie D. White, Note, Modifying the 
Escalera Consent Decree: A Case Study on the Application of the Rufo Test, 23 Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 377 (1996); Bill Alden, Procedure to Evict Drug Dealers Eased, Modification of 
1071 Consent Decree Granted.  New York Law Journal, April 22, pg 1. 
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grandmother and her family – based on the drug arrest of her mentally disabled 
granddaughter several blocks away from public housing grounds.23    
 Between 1991 and 1993, ANSF dedicated a total of two investigators, out 
of a team of 13, to cases arising solely from DEP targeted sites.  In 1994, ANSF 
staff expanded capabilities, adding a total of five investigators through DEP 
funds.  
 
D.  Drug Abuse Treatment and Prevention Program 
  
 DEP’s drug abuse intervention and prevention programs focused on two 
target populations: adolescents and pregnant or post-partum women.  The main 
goal was to provide treatment services for drug-addicted pregnant and post-
partum women and treatment and prevention services for drug-addicted or at-risk 
adolescents, through three strategies: (1) NYCHA hired community outreach 
workers to identify drug-addicted residents, (2) the Department of Health 
provided counselors to prepare drug-addicted residents for treatment, and  (3) the 
program contracted out to local treatment service providers for the treatment 
component of the program.  These programs included health education, individual 
counseling and group activities.  In addition to this primary focus, the program 
provided referrals to treatment services for drug-addicted residents not included in 
the program’s target populations.  
 Funding declined over the years for these services.  NYCHA allocated 
$4.2 million in 1991 to fund pilot programs in three large public housing 
developments: Brownsville, East Harlem, and the South Bronx (Mott-Haven and 
Morrisania).  These funds were not spent during the first DEP year, but instead 
were re-allocated over subsequent years.  By the end of 1993, NYCHA had 
established contracts for treatment services for the three target sites and wanted to 
expand the search for treatment providers citywide.  No further funds were 
allocated for these contracts; NYCHA continued to use the 1991 fiscal funds for 
most treatment contracts.24  By 1997, NYCHA stopped contracting directly with 
drug treatment service providers and the emphasis of the program shifted to 
outreach and referrals in November 1992.  
 Slow referral rates illustrated the problems with this component of DEP.  
                                                 
23 Dep't of Housing. & Urban Development  v Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,(2002) (holding that the 
federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. §  1437d(l)(6) (1994), requires lease terms that give local 
public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the 
household or a guest engaged in drug-related activity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or 
should have known, of the drug-related activity). In New York, public housing officials have 
similar discretion to evict tenants following conviction of co-residents on drug charges. See, also, 
Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
24 Difficulties in the administration of the program contracts were the stated reason for the 
decision to decelerate treatment funding. In particular, NYCHA had trouble ensuring that 
providers were fulfilling their contracts.  For example, one treatment provider, which NYCHA had 
contracted with in August 1995, had provided no services through December of 1995.  NYCHA 
considered initiating default proceedings against the contractor. 
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By January of 1993, a total of 139 residents had been referred to drug treatment 
providers.  However, not until 1994 were residents referred to programs under 
contract with NYCHA.  NYCHA reported that between July and December 1994, 
215 pregnant and post-partum women and 140 adolescents from the three pilots 
sites were referred to contracted programs. An additional 305 residents – not part 
of the program’s target population – were referred to other treatment providers.  
Between July and December 1996, 14 pregnant and post-partum women from 
seven different neighborhoods, 296 adolescents, and 105 other residents were 
referred to treatment services.  In 1998, 801 cases that were identified as having 
substance abuse problems during Termination of Tenancy action proceedings 




IV.  RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 To assess DEP impacts, we use mixed effects panel models to estimate the 
effects of DEP on crime and violence in and around public housing from 1985-96, 
controlling for drug enforcement and the social and structural contexts of public 
housing and the surrounding neighborhoods.  We estimate the effects of DEP 
three ways: first, as a dummy variable representing the period before or after DEP 
implementation in 1991; second, as a continuous (random) effect measured by 
DEP dollar investments (with zeros for the years before DEP); and third, as 
discrete dosages of its primary components of policy and theoretical interest – 
OSH and the tenant patrols.  Since a significant portion of DEP funds 
supplemented law enforcement efforts (through OSH), we include drug arrests as 
a measure of law enforcement that was underwritten by DEP funds.  
 
A.  Study Sample 
 
The study sample is 184 public housing sites, 53.5% of the 344 NYCHA 
housing developments.  We excluded 64 public housing developments (PHDs) 
that do not fit the traditional definition of public housing.25  After accounting for 
                                                 
25 Three categories of public housing were excluded from the sample: buildings that are part of 
the Multi-Family Home Ownership Program (MHOP), senior-only projects, and scattered-site 
housing.  Under MHOP, NYCHA rehabilitated apartments in city-owned buildings and offered 
them for sale to working families in public housing.  See, Glenn Thrush, “Promises, Promises,” 
City Limits June/July (1997).  Although these sites are administered through NYCHA, because 
they are part of a home-ownership program they are not comparable to other public housing sites, 
and are excluded from this study.  Senior-only projects were excluded from the sample because 
these projects introduce different questions and considerations for understanding crime in public 
housing.  Most family projects have a senior population ranging between 10% and 15%.  
Excluding senior-only sites does not have much impact on the age distribution of public housing 
residents.  In 1990, for example, the senior population when all 233 projects are included totals 
14.6%, while in the sample of 182 projects seniors account for 13.6% of the 1990 population.  The 
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administrative consolidations26 among the 280 PHDs, the final sample totals 184 
PHDs.  The final study sample includes all family PHDs in New York City built 
before 1985. 
 
B. Variables, Measures and Data Sources 
 
 1. Drug and Crime Indicators 
 
 NYCHA Incident Reports.  Until the NYC housing and transit police 
departments merged with the NYPD in 1995, NYCHA’s housing police 
maintained independent records for public housing developments.  Complete and 
consistent data is available for 1985 through 1994 for all NYCHA housing 
projects.  These data are available in two forms.  For the entire 10 year period, 
aggregated incident reports are available for each site.  These reports include total 
number of incidents reported to housing authority police broken down by UCR 
Index Crime codes for Part I and Part II offenses.  For the years 1985-1994 
detailed incident reports are available.  These files include details for each 
incident including location (inside a building, or outside, in public area, a 
sidewalk adjacent to the development, etc.), along with information on weapons, 
and characteristics of the victim and perpetrator (where applicable), and whether 
or not the victim is a resident. 
 NYPD Precinct Arrest and Complaint Reports.  We contrast trends in drug 
and crime indicators for the NYCHA developments with the surrounding contexts 
of the local police precincts.  There are several reasons to do this. First, arrest and 
crime reporting trends are significantly influenced by policy and strategy 
undertaken at the local police level.  Prior to the consolidation of the NYPD and 
the Housing Police Department, enforcement and crime indicators were 
commingled between local NYPD precincts as well as the Housing Police.  
                                                                                                                                     
final exclusion is scattered site projects.  These are generally single, walk-up, buildings that have 
been rehabilitated, and are indistinguishable from other buildings in the area.  Buildings that are 
part of the West Side Urban Renewal (WSUR) – buildings throughout the Upper West Side of 
Manhattan managed by the Housing Authority – are examples of these scattered-site projects.  For 
purposes of comparability, this study also excludes developments built after 1985.  The few 
developments built after 1985 are distinct from other public housing sites.  They are much smaller, 
and tend to be rehabilitations of existing buildings or scattered sites. 
26 Administrative consolidations of public housing developments generally take one of two forms.  
The first kind of consolidation occurs with larger public housing developments.  Although built 
contemporaneously, certain PHD sites combine two separate developments.  A second type of 
consolidation is an amalgamation.  This occurs when a new building is added to an already 
existing development. Amalgamations include developments such as Red Hook I & II, 
Queensbridge North & South, Throggs Neck & Addition, and Millbrook & Extension.  In some 
cases, crime complaint and arrest reports are combined for two or more projects due to geographic 
proximity.  Because data are combined for two or more developments, there is no way to 
determine in which PHD a specific incident occurred.  Because there is no way to determine the 
exact site corresponding to the incident reports, tenant characteristics are consolidated across these 
projects, and they are considered one site for the purpose of this study.  
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Second, precinct indicators provide an estimate of larger ecological trends in 
crime in the neighborhoods surrounding the NYCHA developments.  In previous 
research on crime in NYCHA developments (Dumanovsky et al., 1999), we 
estimated hierarchical models of crime that included precinct as well as 
development indicators: the precinct variables were (instead of are) significant in 
each of the models. 
 Complete NYPD Precinct Arrest and Complaint Reports were available 
from 1984 through 1996.  These data are aggregated numbers of UCR crime 
categories (Part I and Part II) by precinct.  The precinct totals for Part I offenses 
do not include Housing Authority Police Department incidents.  NYPD numbers 
for Part II offenses may include housing and transit figures after 1979.  Since the 
consolidation of the Housing Authority Police with the NYPD in 1995, public 
housing complaint and arrest data are no longer maintained by NYCHA.   
 Homicide.  We use homicide victimization data from the Office of Vital 
Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, to construct homicide counts for each census tract and police precinct 
from 1986-96.  Homicides are geocoded based on the last known address of the 
victim.27  The Vital Statistics records are compiled from death certificates 
completed by the Office of the Medical Examiner.  Homicides are classified by 
the Medical Examiner using ICD-10 codes, and integrate investigation 
information from the New York City Police Department.   
   
 2.  Social Structural Variables 
 
  a.  NYCHA Tenant and Site Characteristics.   
 
 NYCHA interviews public housing tenants annually, and maintains yearly 
records of tenant characteristics for each project.  This data is available from 1968 
through 1996, aggregated by project and race: white, black, Hispanic and other.  
The data items are relatively consistent across time.  They include total number of 
families, total population, average income, number of minors, number of elderly, 
number of welfare families, one-parent families, employment (number of families 
with 2 or more persons employed), average tenancy, and number of minors 
broken down by age groups. 
 Public housing site characteristics were obtained from NYCHA’s archived 
records. Measures include total number of buildings, housing units, whether a 
development is reserved exclusively for the elderly, and the borough, community 
                                                 
27 In some cases, the location of the homicide may be some distance from the victim’s residence. 
In a separate study, we examined Medical Examiner records to determine the distances from home 
to location where the body was recovered.  For 80% of young males 15-24 killed during 1987-92, 
their bodies were recovered within one mile of their homes.  We did not examine this for all 
homicides in the sample, although we have no empirical or theoretical reason to assume that the 
findings would differ for other demographic groups.  Accordingly, we equate the victim’s 
residence with the location where the body was recovered.  
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district, and police precinct for each project. 
 
 b.  Tract and Precinct Social Structural Characteristics.   
 
 We included measures of social and economic factors that reflect 
contemporary theory regarding neighborhood, “place” and violence, theories that 
incorporate not just the structural deficits of social areas but also their dynamic 
processes of social control.28  We selected 18 tract-level variables from the 1980, 
1990, and 2000 Census files, and sorted them into seven constructs that reflect 
theoretically relevant dimensions of ecological or neighborhood risk. Dimensions 
include: poverty, racial residential segregation, social control, population mobility 
(anonymity), labor force participation, housing structure, and immigration. All 
data were aggregated at the housing development, census tract, and precinct 
levels. The various constructs were created for each of the three census years, and 
were then interpolated for the interceding years.  
 Social Control. We computed two dimensions of social control.  The first 
captured the extent of supervision of young people within neighborhoods, 
including (1) the concentration of youth population, (2) the percent of female-
headed households with young children, and (3) the ratio of youths to adults.  The 
second dimension examined population size and change, including (1) the overall 
size of the population and (2) residential stability and turnover, based on length of 
residence.   
 Poverty.  We computed three indicators of poverty: (1) percentage of 
households with incomes below the poverty level (2) percent of households 
receiving public assistance, and a Gini coefficient to measure inequality of 
household income of that tract relative to other tracts in the City.  
 Labor Market Participation.  Labor market participation and human 
capital within the tract were measured with several variables: (1) employment 
rates, (2) percent employed in professional or managerial jobs, (3) the percent of 
the adult population over 25 with a high school education, and (4) the overall 
labor force participation rate (i.e., those working and those seeking work). 
 Racial Residential Segregation.  We used a measure of racial 
fragmentation to characterize segregation and population heterogeneity within 
census tracts.29 Residential racial fragmentation is computed as 1 - ((%black)2 + 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Harold Grasmik, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME 
(1993); Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Equality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial 
Dynamics of Urban Violence,  39 Criminology 517 (2001);  Robert J. Sampson et al., Assessing 
“Neighborhood Effects:” Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 Annual Review of 
Sociology 443 (2002); Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, The Natural History of Neighborhood 
Violence, 20 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 121 (2004). 
29 According to 1990 Census data for New York, African Americans are far more likely than 
Hispanics to live in racially segregated areas.  We computed an index of racial fragmentation for 
New York, based on methods developed by Charles Lewis Taylor & Michael C. Hudson, WORLD 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (2nd ed.) 216 (1972). Racial fragmentation is 
a measure of the racial heterogeneity within an area, and is computed as: 
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(%white)2 + (%Hispanic)2 + (%other)2).   
 Housing Structure and Market Conditions.  Three dimensions of housing 
were computed:  (1) vacancy rates: the percentage of vacant housing units, (2) 
overcrowding: the mean number of persons per room in residential units, and (3) 
the percent of housing units that are owner-occupied or rented.  
 Immigration.  Two dimensions of immigration include linguistic isolation 
and whether the head of the household was foreign-born. 
 
B.  Data Analysis 
 
 The general analytic model estimates DEP effects on drug-related and 
other crime indicators. Control variables include drug enforcement, and the social 
structural characteristics of the housing project, tract or precinct, depending on the 
model.  DEP and drug enforcement measures are lagged by one year.  We 
estimate separate models for violent and property crimes in housing projects and 
police precincts.  We estimate models for homicides to assess DEP effects in 
public housing developments.  We included interactions of DEP with the social 
structural characteristics in each unit of analysis to better isolate the effects of 
DEP on specific dimensions of crime risk. 
 In the tract and project models, we control for crime rates in the 
surrounding areas to account for spatial diffusion.30  For tracts, we use the data for 
                                                                                                                                     
 
1 - ((P)2) 
 
 Where P = proportion of each race within the spatial unit.  
 
We divided census tracts into quintiles of this index. African Americans are more likely to reside 
in the most homogeneous tracts, while Hispanics are far more likely to live in racially 
heterogeneous areas: 
 
Quintile* % African Americans % Hispanic 
     1 (Most segregated) 33.74 5.63 
     2 23.25 13.01 
     3 25.32 27.68 
     4 27.34 36.32 
     5 (Least segregated) 20.26 32.09 
 
 
30  For example, Fagan and Davies found evidence of spatial diffusion of homicide from housing 
developments to their surrounding neighborhoods in the Bronx, one of New York’s five boroughs 
(counties), for example, Jeffrey Fagan, & Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing: Two Way 
Diffusion Effects, in ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS : FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE (V. Goldsmith et al., 
eds.) 121  (1999).  Dumanovsky et al. also found that crime rates in public housing were 
dependent on the crime rates in the surrounding neighborhoods.  See, Tamara Dumanovsky, 
Jeffrey Fagan and J. Philip Thompson, The Neighborhood Context of Crime In NYC’s Public 
Housing Projects, Presented at the September Research Institute on Neighborhood Effects on 
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the surrounding police precinct.  For the housing project estimates, we also use 
the crime rate in the surrounding police precinct.  For this analysis, we would 
rather have used tracts, but some larger public housing sites occupy one or more 
census tracts.  To avoid this isomorphism and confounding, we relied instead on 
precinct crime rates.  Although heterogeneous units with ambiguous social 
meaning, precincts have the advantage of being the administrative unit where 
policing policies are implemented and managed.  Because of the large size of 
precincts, we did not include a spatial control in the analyses of precinct-level 
effects. 
 We used mixed effects overdispersed Poisson regression models with an 
autoregressive covariance structure to estimate the impacts of DEP on crime and 
violence rates in and around public housing.31 There are inherent difficulties 
associated with linear (OLS) regression to analyze per capita crime rates for 
aggregated units such as census tracts or precincts.32  Accordingly, we use a 
modified Poisson regression approach to resolve this problem, where the Poisson 
models of counts are transformed into models of per capita offense rates through 
the inclusion of logged population as an independent variables in each of the 
models.33 
 All models were run in using the GLIMMIX macro in the SAS 
Generalized Linear Model procedure.34  We specify both fixed and random effects 
to simulate a hierarchical panel design or growth curve model.35 We include fixed 
effects for project and neighborhood characteristics, fixed effects for prior year 
indicia of violence and crime, drug enforcement in the prior year (lagged), and the 
social and economic indicia of the various ecological contexts.  We include 
random effects for time (to account for within-neighborhood change over time) 
and a quadratic term for time, and random effects to account for the time-varying 
contributions of DEP funding over the panel.  
 We include a Moran’s I statistic36 to assess spatial autocorrelation in the 
                                                                                                                                     
Low-Income Families, Joint Center for Poverty Research, The University of Chicago and 
Northwestern University (1999). 
31 A potential difficulty with the Poisson specification lies with the assumption that the variance 
is equal to the mean, a condition often encountered in event (count) data that are customarily 
overdispersed (where the variance exceeds the mean, as often is the case when there are large 
numbers of zeros in the observations). 
32 See, for example, D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression Analysis Of Aggregate Crime 
Rates, 16 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 21 (2000). 
33 Wayne Osgood, id. 
34  The procedure is PROC MIXED, applying the GLIMMIX macro for generalized linear models 
with mixed effects.  SAS, Inc., Cary, NC.  See, for example, Judith Singer, Using SAS PROC 
MIXED to Fit Multilevel Models, Hierarchical Models, and Individual Growth Models, 24 
Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 322 (1998)  
35  See, for example, Judith Singer, id; William Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (5th edition) 
(2000). 
36 Moran's I is a comparison of the value at any one location with the value at all other locations 
in adjacent (first order) or nearby (second order or higher) spatial units. Moran's I requires an 
intensity value for a crime point (represented here as the centroid of the census tract). This point is 
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crime measures and as a control for crime rates in adjoining areas.37  Spatial 
autocorrelation also permits analyses of the displacement and diffusion of drug-
related violence into the surrounding neighborhoods.  
 Finally, we included a measure to account for the endogeneity of crime 
and social disadvantage within each spatial unit (public housing site, tract, and 
precinct). The measure is the predicted value from a Poisson regression of the 
crime (or homicide) count in the initial year in each series (1986), predicted from 





A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Social and economic characteristics of tracts, precincts, and housing 
projects are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  These measures are the average of 1980 – 
2000 census measures.  Tracts populations range from 10 to 25105, with a mean 
population of 3,446 persons.  Precincts obviously are larger, with populations 
ranging from 23,021 to 225,027, and an average population of 95,624 persons.38  
Public housing developments have populations that range from 10 to 7,411, with a 
mean population of 2267.4 (σ = 1,577.5).  
 There are some revealing measures in Table 6 about NYCHA’s public 
housing developments.  The developments in the sample for this study are quite 
large, averaging more than 10 buildings per site, and number that no doubt is 
pushed higher by the small number of very large projects with multiple buildings.  
Since we excluded consolidations and amalgamations, the large size of these 
projects is noteworthy. More than 40 percent of the population are minors below 
18 years of age, and 13.75% are seniors.  Tenure averages more than 15 years, a 
remarkably long and stable period of residence for most families.  But officially 
reported incomes are extremely low, averaging $12,525 per family per year.  
Nearly one in three families receive either “welfare” (TANF) or other forms of 
public assistance.  Fewer than five percent of the households in public housing 
                                                                                                                                     
then assigned an intensity value, in this case the count of crimes within that tract. The Moran's I 
result varies between -1 and +1. Values closer to +1 indicate high degrees of clustering of similar 
values, either high (positive) or low (negative). Conversely, values closer to -1 demonstrate 
dispersion, where areas with high values are surrounding by neighbors with low values, and vice 
versa. A Moran’s I of 0 suggests that spatial autocorrelation is absent, that event occurrence is 
random. 
37 These are first order estimates. We acknowledge the importance of second order spatial 
influences in recent empirical work, although we do not include second order measures since they 
may confounded with policing or DEP activities in those spatial units.  See, Jeffrey D. Morenoff et 
al., Neighborhood Equality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 
supra note 28.   
38 The Central Park precinct has a tiny population but some crime.  The models in the sections 
following were unaffected by excluding this precinct. 
 XXX]                            FAGAN, DAVIES AND HOLLAND                                           18 
have two adults in the home who are employed.  One family in five is a single-
parent family with minor children.  Just as populations in public housing are 
under-reported to avoid violations of NYCHA contracts and rules, there are strong 
incentives to engage in informal economic activity and avoid other sources of 
income that might jeopardize eligibility if known. 
 
B.  Data Reduction 
 
 For each of the three spatial aggregations, we used principle components 
factor analysis to create a smaller number of theoretically meaningful covariates 
from the 18 separate measures.  As discussed earlier, these dimensions are a 
priori constructs that capture structural features of neighborhoods that are 
correlated with variations in crime rates.  Factor analyses were completed for each 
year in the panel, and the factor scores serve as time-varying covariates in the 
models of DEP effects.  To simplify and illustrate display, Table 7 shows the 
factor derivations for tracts and precincts for 1990, and Table 8 shows factor 
derivations for the public housing developments, also for 1990. 
 For tracts and precincts, factors vary in their explained variance.  Poverty 
and inequality factors are strong, explaining 88.5% of the variance for tracts, and 
92.9% for precincts.  Anonymity and housing factors are the weakest, with 
explained variance ranging from 51.9% to 66.4%.   For public housing 
developments, we constructed two factors, and use single measures for other 
covariates in the model.  Explained variance for a poverty factor and a social 
control factor are shown in Table 8.  
 
 
C.  Estimates of DEP Effects 
 
 For each unit of analysis, we estimated models of DEP effects using 
overdispersed mixed effects Poisson regressions.  We introduce a quadratic time 
component to better fit a model to the curvilinear distribution of crime over the 
study period.  We control for the endogeneity of social structure and crime at the 
start of the time series by estimating a regression of social structure on crime rates 
for the baseline year (1986) at each unit of analysis, and including the predicted 
value from that model as a predictor in the panel analyses.  And, as mentioned 
earlier, we use an offset of the logged population for each unit to approximate an 
analysis of per capita crime rates. 
We use three different measures to estimate DEP effects: (a) a binary 
measure set at 0 for the years preceding DEP and 1 for the years in the panel 
when DEP was in effects, (b) a measure of total DEP funding for each year in the 
series, set at 0 for the years preceding DEP, and (c) specific estimates of the 
effects of OSH and Tenant Patrols, based on DEP investments in these specific 
components.  We limited the components analysis to these two programs due to 
multicollinearity between these two components and the ANSF and Drug Services 
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components.  We could not model project-specific interventions, since many of 
the DEP components were implemented in wide areas encompassing several 
public housing developments.  For example, in the later years of DEP, some 
programs were borough-wide programs.39  For the tract and public housing 
developments, we also include measures of crime in the areas surrounding areas 
for the tract and public housing components.  For the latter, we use the crime rate 
in the precinct where the development is located.  We would have preferred a 
smaller unit, such as the surrounding census tracts or some other definition of 
“neighborhood.”  But some developments were larger than one tract or straddled 
the borders of two tracts, complicating the boundary decision.  DEP effects were 
lagged by one year, as were the effects of drug arrests. 
 
 1.  Precinct Effects. 
 
 Separate analyses examined DEP effects on property and violent crimes.  
We used UCR crime categories to classify crimes into each category.40   
 Table 9a shows the models for DEP effects on violent crimes.  For all 
three measures, DEP interventions significantly reduced crime rates over time.  
The effects of the control variables vary by DEP measure, so there is no clear 
picture of the effects of factors such as drug arrests or the concentration of public 
housing in a precinct.  In all three models, the social structural covariates suggest 
that concentrations of structural risk are correlated with higher violence rates.   
 The analysis of DEP components suggests that these effects are specific to 
OSH interventions.  More aggressive police patrol, coupled with police efforts to 
sustain the initial crime reduction contacts through the “maintenance teams,” 
significantly contributes to lower violence rates.  The effects of tenant patrols, 
designed to strengthen informal social control, does not appear to affect violence 
rates at the precinct level. 
 Of course, precincts are complex places, and there are many confounding 
and unobserved factors that might drive these models.  There are two 
contradictory findings in the investment and components analyses that complicate 
the interpretation of DEP effects on precinct-wide crime rates.  First, the fewer the 
number of public housing sites, the higher the violent crime rates. DEP was 
present in the public housing sites only, and its effects on the surrounding areas 
are uncertain.  Accordingly, we cautiously view the effects on crime rates as 
concentrated in the public housing sites, since DEP was specific to those areas.  
But violent crime rates were higher in precincts with higher concentrations of 
population in public housing.  This may be a project size proxy, since the 
population concentration reflects the presence of very large developments that 
                                                 
39 See, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14. 
40 Violent crimes included reported and verified felony crimes of robbery, rape, other sex crimes, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnap, and assault.  Property crimes included reported and verified felony 
crimes of larceny, motor vehicle theft, and burglary.  
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often dwarf the surrounding areas. Crime problems are more severe in larger 
projects,41 and this variable may be capturing the influence of the overall higher 
crime rates in precincts where developments are spatially concentrated.  
 The effect of DEP on property crime rates is clearer.  Table 9b shows that 
DEP interventions are significant in all three models, including the components 
model.  Controls for public housing sites in the precinct are not significant for the 
property crime models, and drug arrest are significant in only one instance.  In the 
components model, both OSH and tenant patrols are significant, but in opposite 
directions.  It is not hard to understand why these two components should work 
against one another, since these investments moved in opposite directions over 
time.  But why these effects – limited to public housing sites – should influence 
precinct-level property crime rates is a more difficult question.  There is little 
modifying evidence to suggest that these effects are specific to public housing 
sites, such as the concentration of public housing in the precincts.  
 
 2.  Tract Effects 
 
 Here, we are limited to analysis of homicide victimization rates, since geo-
coded crime data are not publicly available for analysis of other crime measures.  
The results of the tract analysis in Table 10 are consistent with the precinct 
analysis.  DEP effects are large, significant, and in the expected direction.  In the 
components analysis, OSH significantly predicts lower homicide rates, but tenant 
patrols are not a significant predictor of homicide rates.  These models control for 
the effects of homicide in the surrounding census tracts. 
 The dummy variable for whether the tract contains a public housing site is 
significant in the binary and components models, but the coefficient is negative.  
Accordingly, tracts with public housing sites have overall higher homicide rates 
compared to other tracts, as shown graphically in Figure 1.  In this table, the 
beneficial effects of DEP are evident, even after we control for base rate 
differences in homicide risk in public housing sites over time, and for homicide 
rates in surrounding census tracts. 
 This analysis also shows that drug sale and drug possession arrests are 
associated with higher homicide rates in census tracts.  This counter-intuitive 
effect is not surprising in the context of street-level drug markets. Higher drug 
arrests are a marker for higher violence rates in both neighborhood studies42 and 
city-level analyses.43 Drug markets often stable and institutionalized, despite their 
                                                 
41  See, for example, Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in New York City 
Public Housing, supra note 30. 
42 Fagan and Davies, The Effects of Drug Enforcement on the Rise and Fall of Homicide in New 
York City, 1985-96, Final Report, Grant  031675, Substance Abuse Policy Research Program, 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2002). 
43 Graham Ousey and Matthew R. Lee, Examining the Conditional Nature of the Illicit Drug 
Markets-Homicide Relationship: A Partial Test of the Theory of Contingent Causation. 40 
Criminology 101 (2002); Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, 
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illicit activity and the potential harms from drug abuse.44 Disrupting markets 
introduces instability, and such instability often is the spark for lethal violence.45  
High rates of arrests may have the short-term effect of destabilizing drug markets 
by removing social controls exerted by drug organizations intent on keeping 
neighborhoods stable to avoid problems with the police.46  Accordingly, drug 
enforcement may have a churning effect on drug markets that invites instability 
and conflict.  When drug offenders are removed via arrest, they were quickly 
replaced by a supply of young men whose income potential seemed far better in 
illegal work than in legal work. The competition among new sellers and newly 
emerging organizations often is a fertile context for renewed and recurring 
violence.47 
 
 3.  DEP Effects in NYCHA Developments 
 
 There were no significant effects of DEP interventions in the housing 
projects themselves, either on violence or property crime rates.  Table 11a shows 
the results for the analysis of DEP effects on violence.  The positive coefficients 
for the violence rate in the surrounding precinct suggests that project crime rates 
are significantly influenced by what happens in the surrounding social context.  
Drug possession arrests in the projects also appear to influence violent crime in 
two of the models, perhaps suggesting a demand-side suppression effect on drug 
                                                                                                                                     
Burglary, and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis, 35 Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 316 (1998); Richard Rosenfeld and Scott H. Decker, Are Arrest Statistics 
a Valid Measure of Illicit Drug 
Use? 16 Justice Quarterly 685 (1999). 
44 See, Judith Matloff, Whose Neighborhood?  New York Times, July 14, 2002, for a detailed 
account of a northern Manhattan neighborhood where several drug sellers took strong measures to 
keep their neighborhood safe and avoid attention from the police.  Several studies suggest that 
drug enforcement removes established drug sellers from established territories, from 
organizational positions in drug organizations, and from stable business relationships with 
customers.  The vacuum created by aggressive drug enforcement is quickly filled by competing 
drug selling groups, and new sellers arrive to establish business relationships with active buyers 
seeking new sources of drug supplies. But, when several groups or individuals compete to fill 
these vacuums, the possibility arises for disputes and conflicts that are settled by violence.  Also, 
when organizations are destabilized by arrests, internal organizational conflicts may arise as group 
members compete to assume higher positions in their organizations that were vacated following 
arrests and convictions. Again, such internal instability may be resolved by violence.  
45 See, for example, Paul Goldstein, et al.,Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A 
Conceptually-Based Event Analysis, 16 Contemporary Drug Problems 161 (1990); Phillippe 
Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT (1995); Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation Of 
Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, And Youth In The 1990s, 88 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 1233 (1998); 
46 See, for example, Robert Jackall, WILD COWBOYS (1997) 
47 Bourgois, supra note 45; Robert Jackall, WILD COWBOYS, id; Sudhir Alli Venkatesh, 
AMERICAN PROJECT (2000); Jeffrey Fagan and Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and 
Social Identity, in Youth Violence (M. Tonry and M.H. Moore, eds.), 24 Crime and Justice 373 
(1998). 
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markets due perhaps to increased police activity focused less on sales than on 
drug possession.  Table 11b shows no effects of either DEP or drug arrests or 
precinct crime rates on property crimes in public housing.   
We suggest caution in comparing these models to the previous ones, given 
differences in measurement and data sources.  Recall that the measure of crime in 
this analysis is taken from NYCHA incident reports, and its validity may differ 
from police or public health data used in the previous analyses.  At the same time, 
any measurement error in this series is stable over time within sites, so estimates 
of within-site changes in crime rates are likely to be stable.  Accordingly, we 
regard these results are reliable, and measurement error may have only a minor 




 Table 12 provides a summary of the estimates of DEP effects on violence 
and property crimes in and around public housing.  The absence of effects within 
public housing is less surprising in the context of how DEP funds were allocated 
and applied by the NYPD.  DEP was focused on housing sites, but also was 
sufficiently diffused in the NYPD’s broader administrative units – police service 
areas, or PSA’s – to provide resources that benefited law enforcement generally.  
Seen this way, DEP was an important and strategically valuable supplement to the 
NYPD’s strategic response to a particularly acute violence and crime epidemic.48  
It allowed the police to focus not just on crimes in public housing, but in the 
surrounding areas, as well.  This strategy is consistent with the reality that crime 
problems in public housing are reciprocally tied to crime problems in the 
surrounding areas.49 
 But the absence of measurable and positive effects within public housing 
speaks to the one-sided nature of the enforcement strategy.  The policing strategy 
was well-supported and active both within public housing and the surrounding 
areas.  The non-enforcement components of DEP were targeted specifically 
within public housing sites: tenant patrols and drug treatment for its residents.  
These were poorly funded and the efforts diluted, considering NYCHA’s vast 
landscape.  These low funding levels per site may have limited the development 
and effectiveness of the non-enforcement approaches. Moreover, the reaction of 
minority communities to the NYPD’s aggressive police tactics may have led to 
adverse responses by residents to the intensive drug patrols, animating their 
                                                 
48 See, for example, George Kelling and William Souza, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the 
Impact of New York City=s Police Reforms (2001), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/cr_22.pdf, 
visited March 14, 2003.  Kelling and Souza see New York’s crime decline as the result of the 
adoption of a strategy of aggressive policing of social and physical disorder via “zero tolerance” 
policies and high rates of misdemeanor arrests, which in turn had prophylactic effects on crime 
rates. 
49 Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in Public Housing, supra note 30; Jeffrey 
Fagan and Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing, supra note 14.  
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withdrawal from their own participation in social control and security.50  The 
failure to mount viable interventions that directly touched on the drug problems, 
social and economic lives, or normative orientations of NYCHA residents may 
explain their withdrawal from social regulation, and in turn, the absence of DEP 
effects within projects.  In the next section, we discuss the reasons why. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 DEP was launched in 1990 at the peak of New York City’s epidemic of 
lethal violence, much of which was animated by the explosive growth of street-
level drug markets.51  DEP was launched concurrently with other strong crime 
control measures, most prominently “Operation Safe Streets.”52 Within two years 
of the launch of DEP, and Operation Safe Streets, crime rates began to decline in 
the City.53 Homicide and non-lethal injuries, a reliable measure of criminal 
violence that is independent of police reporting influences, declined slowly in 
1992 and 1993, and then began a precipitous decline that lasted through the end of 
the decade. Apportioning the reduction to DEP, other crime control measures, a 
general decline in drug epidemics, or to a secular decline in violence and crime 
due to economic or other social forces, is a conceptual and empirical challenge 
and a contentious public policy debate.  
 In this study, we attempted to isolate the effects of DEP as one such policy 
change.  Using official records, we also show how formal social control – drug 
arrests, primarily, conducted by special teams – contributed to the reduction of 
crime and violence in the areas surrounding public housing, but appeared to have 
little influence on the public housing sites they targeted.  Based on this trend, we 





                                                 
50 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and 
the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s 
Moral Values, 66 Social Psychology Quarterly 153 (2003). 
51 Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, 
Violence, Drugs, And Youth In The 1990s, 88 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1233 
(1998); Phillippe Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT, supra note 45; Ansley Hamid, The Political 
Economy of Crack-Related Violence,” 17 Contemporary Drug Problems 31 (1990); Bruce D. 
Johnson, et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Core Drug Users and the 
Community, 13 Crime and Justice 9 (1990). 
52 See, for example, Andrew Karmen, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY, supra note 2; Michele 
Sviridoff, et al., The Neighborhood Effects of New York City’s Tactical Narcotics Team on Three 
Brooklyn Precincts:  Evaluation of the Tactical Narcotics Teams (1992). 
53 Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York: A Tale of Two Epidemics, 88 J. Crim. L. 
& Crim’l’gy 1277 (1998),; Karmen, supra note 2. 
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A.  Drug Control as Leveraged Social Control 
 
 Public housing in New York City accounts for a sizable portion of housing 
in many poor neighborhoods, and in some communities it is the primary type of 
housing.54 Although crime rates sometimes differ in public housing compared to 
the surrounding area, public housing developments exert a strong influence on the 
neighborhoods surrounding them, but so too do those neighborhoods influence 
crime within the housing developments they surround.  Also, the correlates of 
crime in public housing are not necessarily those found in the city as a whole, or 
in other poor urban areas.55  Accordingly, the embeddedness of public housing in 
broader ecological dynamics of their surrounding neighborhoods is an empirical 
fact that bears on the impacts of the DEP program.  
 The diffusion of social order and patterns of social exchanges in public 
housing “neighborhoods” suggests that the fates of persons living in public 
housing and persons living in their surrounding areas are tightly linked.  Policy 
decisions that located public housing in specific neighborhoods, which themselves 
already were burdened by concentrated poverty, racial segregation, and weakened 
mechanisms of informal social control, placed those burdens de facto on the 
residents of public housing.  This history of urban development reciprocally 
shaped neighborhood ecologies and the fates of public housing developments.56  
The effects of more recent policy decisions concerning changes in welfare policy, 
housing policies, and public housing eligibility are still unknown.  But, together 
with well-publicized changes in police intervention strategies in New York City,57 
housing policy decisions that target drugs and crime held out the promise to 
significantly improve the ecology of poor neighborhoods. 
 DEP must be viewed, then, not just in its ability to root out and suppress 
drug and crime problems in public housing, but in its ability to foster sustainable 
changes in the capacity for social control among public housing residents.  The 
first goal – to root out crime and drug problems – was pursued through strong 
investments of DEP funds in Operation Safe Homes, increasing patrol strength 
and focusing its resources in pubic housing.  OSH was coupled with special 
prosecutions of public housing residents to intensify its deterrence efforts.  
The second goal – strengthening informal social control by increasing 
resident participation in patrol and other collective action projects – was informed 
                                                 
54 Peter Marcuse, Interpreting Public Housing History, 12 Journal of Architectural and Planning 
Research 240 (1995); Dumanovsky,  et al., Neighborhood Variation in Crime in Public Housing, 
supra note 30; Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and H. Swartz, Social Capital and the Revitalization 
of New York City’s Distressed Inner-City Neighborhoods, 9 Housing Policy Debate 17 (1998). 
55 Tamara Dumanovsky, Neighborhood Context of Crime in Public Housing, supra note 30; 
Garth Davies, Social Ecology and the Diffusion of Crime and Violence In and Around Public 
Housing in New York City (doctoral dissertation) (2003). 
56 Peter Marcuse, Public Housing History,  supra note 54. 
57 Willam Bratton and Peter Knobler, TURNAROUND (1998); George Kelling and Catherine Coles, 
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS (1996); Fagan and Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows, supra 
note 11. 
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by theories that emphasize the importance of social regulation and collective 
efficacy in reducing crime.58  DEP pursued this goal, for a time, by investing in 
tenant organizations and social services that would enhance the capacity of 
citizens to exert social control by (a) building social ties between citizens and (b) 
strengthening ties between citizens and law enforcement.59  The results of these 
processes were designed to strengthen forms of informal social control to reduce 
crime and drug problems.  In other words, DEP was designed to promote the 
expansion of social capital by increasing the capacity for supervision.  
 
B.  Diffusion of Efforts in a Political Context 
 
 When interviewed, residents reported that drug and alcohol problems 
improved in public housing, and that crime and unwarranted police harassment 
also declined during this time.60 Physical and social disorder also waned as a 
perceived problem in and around many of the public housing sites included in 
these surveys.   But residents said that these improvements were unrelated to DEP 
programs, and that policing under DEP was largely unchanged from previous 
eras.  Residents reported that their involvement with the police, as well as social 
ties among residents, remained unchanged, and few respondents reported general 
improvements in their perceived safety.  Social capital – as measured in these 
interviews by the extent of local social ties and citizen interactions – either 
declined or remained unchanged in most public housing sites.  Thus, residents 
generally were unwilling to attribute improvements in the problems of drugs, 
crime and disorder as linked to better policing, stronger tenant activity, or closer 
ties among public housing residents.  
 Thus, the good news of perceived improvements in tenants’ lives is 
tempered by the fact that the sources of these improvements were un related to 
DEP, nor to other measurable or sustainable changes in social interactions or 
social organization among public housing tenants.   The goal to strengthen social 
capital and informal social control involved transfer of some burden of social 
control over time from police to citizens.  Social control is strongest when citizens 
partner with legal actors to enforce laws.61  In DEP, the balance of social control 
functions remained primarily the province of the police, and these efforts were 
                                                 
58 Robert J. Sampson, et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Model of Collective 
Efficacy, 277 Science 918 (1997). 
59 Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Harold Grasmick, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME (1993); Sampson et 
al., id; Wesley Skogan, DISORDER AND DECLINE (1990); Ralph B. Taylor, BREAKING AWAY FROM 
BROKEN WINDOWS (2001). 
60 See, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14.  In this study, 
interviews were completed with 752 respondents including residents and NYCHA staff in 62 
NYCHA developments located in 19 neighborhoods, in 1998-2000.  Of these 752, 87.3% were 
NYCHA residents.  
61 See, for example, Charles Tittle, CONTROL BALANCE (1996). 
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diffused throughout the department, often with harsh effects.62  Despite the 
intention to address crime and drug problems in public housing, police 
internalized DEP funds as part of an overall strategic facelift for the department.   
 The disproportionate allocation of DEP funds to enforcement and the 
relatively smaller and more diluted investments in tenant programs (informal 
social control), were noted by residents.  In contrast, DEP resources for tenant 
social and preventive programs were diffused throughout NYCHA’s public 
housing sites.  The programs were generally underfunded, thematically 
inconsistent, and not created with an eye toward permanence or even 
sustainability. In key informant interviews,63 law enforcement officials, NYCHA 
administration, and tenant leaders all described DEP a program that was primarily 
a supplement to ongoing policing programs, that was indistinguishable from the 
routine policing tactics in public housing, and that only casually and haphazardly 
supported social developmental or preventive programs.64  They characterized 
Operation Safe Homes DEP funds as a means to expand policing, not to develop 
new forms of patrol that reflected the reality of public housing or its unique crime 
problems. Under DEP, no special programs were created, no new initiatives were 
developed or tested, and nothing sustainable apart from everyday command-and-
control policing was developed or sustained under this program.65 
 Police tactics in this era were controversial and racialized, and the racial 
imbalances in policing often were flashpoints for social tension conflict between 
minority citizens and police since 1994.66 The concentration of African 
Americans and Hispanics in public housing increased their exposure to the 
aggressive police tactics of this era.  In many African American communities, the 
racial breach was an impediment to police-citizen cooperation. In public housing, 
OSH extended these policing tactics to largely poor and nonwhite citizens, 
                                                 
62 “Operation Condor” was created during this era, an initiative of the New York City Police 
Department that used overtime pay to motivate police officers to make “buy-and-bust” arrests for 
drug offenses.  The program produced thousands of arrests across the City, but its tactics raised 
complaints from minority citizens about its racial disproportionality, and the excessive use of a 
full criminal justice process (including the use of pretrial detention rather than summons) for low-
level drug offenders whose crimes were mostly non-violent and who posed a minimal public 
safety threat.  The death of Patrick Dorismond, an unarmed citizen who was approached by 
Condor officers who tried to sell him marijuana during an Operation Condor arrest, heightened 
racial tensions between minority citizens and the police.  Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force: Why 
Patrick Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, The New Republic, Apr. 10, 2000, at 26; see also William 
Rashbaum, Police Suspend Extra Patrols for 10 Days, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2000, at B1. 
63 Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Control in Public Housing, supra note 14.    Key informants included 12 
NYPD police officers from all PSA’s in the city, 13 tenant association leaders and providers of 
DEP-funded social service programs within NYCHA. 
64 Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Control in Public Housing, id.   
65 Id, at __. 
66 New York State Attorney General, 1999; David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit 
Exacts a Toll on the Streets, New York Times, February 15, 1999, at A1; Kit R. Roane, Minority 
Private-School Students Claim Police Harassment, New York Times, March 26, 1999, at B5; Fagan 
and Davies, id. 
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weakening police-citizen cooperation to create the reciprocal social controls 
essential to effective crime control. Many respondents complained that these 
tactics tended to isolate citizens from the police, and offered no incentive for 
citizens to engage with one another or with OSH or the police generally in the co-
production of security.  Instead, citizens continued their reliance on formal social 
control, and the difficult and delicate process of social capital development was 
stillborn.  
 Many of these complaints applied equally to the Anti-Narcotic Strike 
Force.  At a time when the courts in New York City were returning to a 
philosophy of individualized justice, and in a historical context when the courts 
were reorganizing in most boroughs to provide drug treatment services and a 
theory of therapeutic jurisprudence,67 the ANSF pursued an aggressive program 
of prosecution of both petty and serious drug offenders in public housing.  
Treatment was not a part of ANSF actions, which were focused on either the 
removal of offending families from public housing or the incarceration of drug 
offenders.  Cases were brought against public housing tenants without discretion, 
and with little attention to the individual context of the case or the potential 
impact of prosecution on collateral parties.  Nearly all incidents were processed 
formally through one or more available legal routes.  While some prosecutions 
were seen by key informants as important weapons against well organized drug 
dealers, the formality of ANSF also led to prosecutions of low-level users and 
drug possessors whose incarceration or eviction was not seen as contributing 
substantially to drug control or crime reduction. 
 DEP perhaps was a lost opportunity, both for innovation and for testing of 
new ways to control and eliminate drug problems.  Identifying the unique 
contributions of DEP in an era of declining crime rates is difficult, and was 
further complicated by its diffused implementation.  Second, the blurring of lines 
between everyday police patrol and OSH (especially post-merger) defeated efforts 
to rigorously estimate the crime control effects of special policing in the PSA’s 
and in the public housing sites. The narrow scope of interventions, inability to 
distinguish DEP component from ongoing policies and tactics, and the generally 
weak “dosage” of efforts or investment in social programs and tenant patrol 
across the 184 public housing sites, formed a weak program that was barren of 
vision, theory or execution.  Public housing residents and key informants both 




C.  Social Norms and Drug Control in Public Housing 
 
                                                 
67  Drug treatment courts opened during this time in every borough except Manhattan.  See, 
Berman et al, Institutionalizing Innovation, supra note 13. 
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 There are realizable pathways to the original vision of DEP that offer the 
promise of sustainable impacts that can accomplish both the suppression and 
social developmental components of DEP. The pivotal kernel is a strategy that 
brings citizens and police into closer collaboration to address problems of crime, 
drugs and disorder.  DEP offered no new vision of policing, and in fact, simply 
intensified a policing and prosecution regime that was antagonistic to many 
citizens.   
 The incentives for people to engage with legal actors in social regulation 
and the co-production of security may lie in their evaluations of their treatment by 
the police. Fairness and crackdowns may be inconsistent, but at least citizens 
know they are tradeoffs. Recent work by Tom Tyler, based on a survey of 
residents in three Oakland, California neighborhoods suggests that citizens’ 
evaluations of legal actors are not linked to the outcomes of their court cases or 
interactions with police, or on the crime rate in their neighborhood.68  Tyler 
focuses instead on the fairness of their treatment from those authorities. Ron 
Weitzer reaches the same conclusion in a survey of residents of three 
neighborhoods in Washington DC.69  He reports contrasting evaluations of police 
services in two predominantly black neighborhoods. Proactive policing of 
residents of a poor, high crime neighborhood elicited less favorable reactions to 
police than did the more reactive and respectful treatment of citizens in an 
“orderly” middle class neighborhood.70  
 Although the law is based on the implicit or explicit threat of sanctioning 
for wrongdoing, the legal system depends heavily on voluntary compliance from 
most citizens to set and enforce norms, and to engage with the police in social 
control.  Hence, lower levels of legitimacy make social regulation more costly and 
difficult, both materially and politically.  The police depend heavily on the 
voluntary cooperation of citizens to fight crime.  Citizens report crime and 
criminals, informally help to police their neighborhoods, and aid the courts as 
jurors and witnesses.  Without these cooperative acts from the public, the police 
risk being seen as an intrusive force imposing order.  And without these acts, the 
meaning of order becomes detached from its social basis and loses its moral 
weight to influence others in the community. 
 A social norms approach would invite policing of drug problems in the 
context of corresponding and contemporaneous extra-legal social initiatives aimed 
                                                 
68 Tom Tyler and Y. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE 
POLICE AND COURTS (2002) ;  See, also,Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust And Confidence In Legal 
Authorities: What Do People Want From The Law And Legal Institutions?, 19 Behavioral Science 
and the Law 215 (2001). 
69 Ronald Weitzer,.  Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 Law 
& Soc’y Review 129 (2000) 
70 Weitzer, Id..  Weitzer’s findings stand Broken Windows theory on its head by suggesting that 
the police may be reacting to the visible cues of crime and disorder, not just would-be criminals 
who might journey to a disorderly neighborhood to take advantage of crime opportunities. 
Weitzer’s findings suggest that in neighborhoods with visible signs of disorder, police react with 
indiscriminate and widespread patterns of aggressive stops and interdiction of citizens. 
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at the same or parallel problems.  These realistically balanced efforts reflect a 
more complex view of the interaction of crime and drugs, one that recognizes 
their spurious relationship to broader underlying social and physical conditions 
within neighborhoods. While OSH and ANSF approaches might promote a 
temporary reduction of crime through suppression, a legitimacy-focused approach 
promotes construction of social networks that integrate community-level social 
processes with the regulation of crime and disorder. 
 
Table 1.  Comparison of Social Indicators and Homicide Rates in New York City 







Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Homicide (counts)* 1.87 1.29 0.53 0.75
% Households with Public Assistance Income± 31.54 13.36 11.65 11.54
Gini for Total Household Income 0.47 0.04 0.36 0.09
% Households Under Poverty Level 38.39 13.76 15.63 13.23
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+ 51.20 12.95 68.16 15.75
% in Managerial, Professional, or Technical Jobs 20.91 10.83 30.75 15.28
Employment Rate 83.32 6.72 91.11 6.64
Labor Force Participation Rate 50.97 9.31 61.81 11.24
% Nonwhite 85.74 22.67 51.14 35.71
Racial Fragmentation Index 0.45 0.15 0.37 0.20
% Female Headed Households with Children < 18 21.56 10.28 8.70 9.55
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24) 1.60 0.90 2.52 2.16
% Youth Population (5-15) 20.28 6.05 14.02 6.50
Population 4885 2603 3118 2381
Residential Mobility - Same House as 5 Years Ago 66.42 8.92 62.51 12.08
% Foreign Born 17.05 12.19 28.56 14.98
% Linguistic Isolation 12.25 9.69 10.80 10.17
Vacancy Rate 4.38 4.34 5.67 6.08
% Occupied Units that are Rentals 90.69 10.41 61.99 25.48
  
% Tracts Containing Public Housing 10.56  
Public Housing Population  1801 1661  
% Tract Population comprised of Public Housing 
 
37.37 25.63  
* Homicide measures are average for 1985-96 period.  Per capita rates show similar 
differences: .41 per 1,000 persons in public housing tracts, .19 per 1,000 persons in tracts 
without public housing. 
 
± Indicators are calculated from 1990 Census Data, which is midpoint of 1985-96 study 
interval. 
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Figure 1.  Homicide Rates in NYC Census Tracts























Tracts With Public Housing
Tracts Without Public Housing
 
 Source: Injury Prevention Program, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, various years 
 
 





















          
1985 447,944 160,545 2.79 11.9 27.5 13.3 9.3 17.5 19.7 
1986 441,483 160,481 2.75 12.3 27.6 13.8 9.1 17.7 19.2 
1987 434,763 159,915 2.72 12.4 27.5 14.4 8.8 17.8 19.0 
1988 432,160 159,152 2.72 12.5 28.6 14.9 8.4 18.3 18.8 
1989 422,445 159,974 2.64 13.4 28.6 14.9 7.6 18.3 17.5 
1990 422,347 160,578 2.63 13.6 29.3 15.4 7.4 19.1 17.6 
1991 424,308 160,162 2.65 13.5 30.3 15.7 7.0 19.1 17.6 
1992 410,586 159,207 2.58 13.2 30.9 15.0 6.4 20.6 17.6 
1993 413,923 160,029 2.59 13.2 31.1 16.2 6.4 20.6 17.5 
1994 399,822 156,042 2.56 13.3 31.1 16.7 6.2 20.6 17.9 
1995 391,420 153,936 2.54 13.4 31.0 17.1 6.0 20.5 18.2 
1996 392,430 155,325 2.53 13.4 30.1 17.1 5.9 20.4 17.8 
Source:  New York City Housing Authority, Annual Tenant Recertification Surveys, various years 
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Table 3.  DEP Annual Budget by Program Components, 1991-96 
Programs 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Operation Safe Home $4,222,697 $4,417,763 $7,395,957 $14,040,143 $22,030,824 $19,441,604
Tenant Patrol 59,371 76,547 178,055 165,000 1,136,995 1,265,038
Anti-Narcotics Strike Force 76,186 122,677 82,482 978,781 648,603 1,060,803
Drug Abuse Contracts 4,171,410      
Treatment Services 838,544 2,680,339 2,033,244 1,329,826   
Drug Prevention  1,325,224   1,034,117  
Drug Abuse Treatment      819,216
Domestic Violence Program 750,000 395,000 1,040,548 94,305 605,000 1,198,470
Resident Programs 1,276,448 2,810,786 2,436,709 5,211,291   
Community Center Programs    3,025,849 10,622,000 8,445,052
Youth Sports Programming       
Anti-Graffiti    1,406,013 969,381 1,211,636
Seasonal Jobs Program    6,123,174 1,518,993 1,110,179
Summer Youth Employment       
Parenting Skills  109,298 24,948 78,997   
Career Training  2,773,627 1,388,870 5,769,208 1,862,234  
Streetworker 188,898 80,926 248,148    
City Scouts    127,790   
Drug Elimination Staff 334,005 243,176 671,876    
Grants Administration    65,000 150,000 167,921
Partners in Reading      182,105
D.A.R.E./G.R.E.A.T.      97,976
Security Repair Team 249,700      
Security Repair Materials 531,522      
Physical Improvements    294,000   
Police Equipment    118,000   
Total $12,698,781 $15,035,363 $15,500,837 $38,827,377 $40,578,147 $35,000,000
 
Table 4. Annual Budget Allocation by DEP Program Components, 1991-99 ($M)   
        

















1991 4.223 0.059 0.076 5.010 2.549 0.781 12.699 
1992 4.418 0.077 0.123 4.006 6.413 0.000 15.035 
1993 7.396 0.178 0.082 2.033 5.811 0.000 15.501 
1994 14.040 0.165 0.979 1.330 21.902 0.412 38.827 
1995 22.031 1.137 0.649 1.034 15.728 0.000 40.578 
1996 19.442 1.265 1.061 0.917 12.315 0.000 35.000 
Total 71.55 2.88 2.97 14.33 64.718 1.193 157.64 
Percent  45.3 1.83 1.88 9.1 41.05 0.08 100 
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Table 5.  Social Structural Characteristics of New York City Census Tracts and 
Police Precincts, 1990 
 Tracts Precincts 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
% Households with Public Assistance Income 13.03 11.95 14.26 10.87
Gini for Total Household Income 0.38 0.08 0.40 0.07
% Households Under Poverty Level 18.91 14.22 20.99 12.50
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+ 66.16 15.48 66.57 14.36
% in Managerial, Professional, or Technical Jobs 29.73 14.78 32.45 14.90
Employment Rate 90.32 6.01 89.93 4.53
Labor Force Participation Rate 59.65 9.52 60.01 8.01
% Nonwhite 56.49 35.28 59.05 29.99
Racial Fragmentation Index 0.39 0.18 0.48 0.15
% Female Headed Households with Children < 18 10.44 9.53 11.02 8.27
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24) 2.29 1.35 2.27 1.13
% Youth Population (5-15) 15.33 6.13 14.93 5.58
Population 3446 2312 95524 43237
Residential Mobility - Same House 5 Years Ago 62.91 9.42 61.94 5.41
% Foreign Born 28.67 14.65 27.10 12.51
% Linguistic Isolation 11.10 9.47 11.43 8.18
Vacancy Rate 5.51 4.43 6.01 3.08
% Occupied Units that are Rentals 65.82 25.02 73.97 18.18




Table 6.  Social and Economic Characteristics of NYCHA 
Residents and Developments, 1986-95 
Variable Mean SD
Income 12525 3537
% Minors (Under Age 21) 43.49 7.92
% Seniors (Age 62 and Older) 13.75 7.63
% Families Receiving Welfare 29.35 12.11
% Families with One Parent and Children < 18 21.28 9.76
% Families with 2 or more Persons Employed 4.56 3.49
Racial Fragmentation Index 0.46 0.15
Tenure 15.53 3.56
Number of Buildings 10.47 9.28
Source: New York City Housing Authority, Annual Resident Certification Surveys, 
various years 
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Table 7.  Principle Components Factor Analysis, New York City Census Tracts & Police Precincts, 1990 







Poverty/Inequality  2.65 88.5 2.79 92.9 
% Households Under Poverty Level 0.971  0.980  
% Households with Public Assistance Income 0.940  0.941  
Gini for Total Household Income 0.909  0.971  
Labor Market/Human Capital  2.69 67.2 3.33 83.4 
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+ 0.929  0.942  
% in Managerial, Professional, Technical Jobs 0.836  0.895  
Employment Rate 0.774  0.899  
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.726  0.915  
Segregation  1.30 64.8 1.09 54.7 
Racial Fragmentation Index 0.805  0.739  
% Nonwhite 0.805  0.739  
Supervision  2.27 75.6 2.38 79.3 
%Youth Population (5-15) 0.937  0.917  
% Female Headed Households with Children  
Under 18 
0.847  0.844  
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24) -0.819  -0.909  
Anonymity  1.04 51.9 1.33 66.4 
Population - 1990 0.720  0.815  
Residential Mobility - Same House as 1985 0.720  0.815  
Immigration  1.53 76.7 1.61 80.3 
Linguistic Isolation 0.876  0.896  
Foreign Born 0.876  0.896  
Housing Structure  1.15 57.3 1.18 58.8 
%Occupied Units that are Rentals 0.757  0.767  




Table 8. Factor Composition – NYCHA Public Housing (1990)* 




Public Housing Poverty   1.71 85.5
% Families Receiving Welfare 0.925 
Income -0.925 
Public Housing Social Control   1.84 91.8
% Minors (Under Age 21) 0.958 





      *  Factor scores computed for each year from 1985-96, 1990 shown as illustration. 
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Effect t p(t) t p(t) t p(t)
Intercept 2.38 0.020 1.27 0.209 0.60 0.550
Time 13.25 0.000 12.61 0.000 5.63 0.000
Time2 -13.18 0.000 -12.29 0.000 -5.35 0.000
DEP -5.55 0.000 -9.10 0.000
Operation Safe Homes -13.36 0.000
Tenant Patrols 1.94 0.057
Number of Public Housing Sites -1.39 0.164 -2.39 0.018 -3.14 0.002
% Population in Public Housing 1.55 0.122 2.47 0.014 3.27 0.001
Drug Possession Arrests (logged) -3.81 0.000 -0.96 0.339 1.66 0.099
Drug Sale Arrests (logged) 1.16 0.248 2.56 0.011 0.36 0.723
Endogeneity 11.13 0.000 15.22 0.000 15.34 0.000
Precinct Social Characteristics
Population (Logged) 3.06 0.002 5.83 0.000 6.58 0.000
Poverty 3.60 0.000 2.01 0.046 2.15 0.034
Human Capital 3.16 0.002 2.35 0.020 2.50 0.014
Segregation 2.68 0.008 5.92 0.000 5.65 0.000
Social Control - Supervision 1.92 0.055 0.41 0.685 1.09 0.276
Social Control - Anonymity 0.27 0.787 0.29 0.770 -0.62 0.536
Immigration 1.03 0.305 0.21 0.832 0.60 0.548
Housing 4.15 0.000 5.75 0.000 6.47 0.000
DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty -0.07 0.944 -0.33 0.739 -1.06 0.290
DEP*Human Capital 0.25 0.805 -0.49 0.626 -0.58 0.563
DEP*Segregation 1.50 0.135 -0.80 0.422 -0.29 0.769
DEP*Supervision -0.38 0.708 0.75 0.454 1.62 0.107
DEP*Anonymity 0.52 0.605 -1.23 0.220 -1.43 0.156
DEP*Immigration -0.26 0.796 -0.90 0.367 -1.78 0.077
DEP*Housing -0.91 0.365 -1.24 0.215 -0.77 0.441
 Model Statistics:   -2LL
Table 9a.  Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Violent Crime Rates, New York City Police 
Precincts, 1986-96
-827.00 -301.7 -473.2
DEP Binary DEP Investment DEP Components
 
 
Effect t p(t) t p(t) t p(t)
Intercept 1.71 0.091 -2.59 0.012 5.56 0.000
Time 9.71 0.000 13.30 0.000 -5.13 0.000
Time2 -9.76 0.000 -12.85 0.000
DEP -6.91 0.000 -11.19 0.000
Operation Safe Homes -13.91 0.000
Tenant Patrols 4.12 0.000
Number of Public Housing Sites -1.61 0.108 -0.15 0.878 -0.31 0.754
% Population in Public Housing 1.32 0.187 -0.69 0.488 -0.63 0.531
Drug Possession Arrests (logged) -3.08 0.002 -1.56 0.120 0.54 0.589
Drug Sale Arrests (logged) -1.16 0.248 1.67 0.097 -0.35 0.727
Endogeneity 10.28 0.000 19.19 0.000 19.42 0.000
Precinct Social Characteristics
Population (Logged) 3.43 0.001 9.77 0.000 10.49 0.000
Poverty 3.76 0.000 -1.32 0.188 -1.36 0.176
Human Capital 4.62 0.000 -0.70 0.485 -0.90 0.372
Segregation 0.66 0.507 1.18 0.239 1.36 0.178
Social Control - Supervision -0.89 0.374 -3.24 0.001 -3.59 0.001
Social Control - Anonymity 0.33 0.742 -1.93 0.054 -2.54 0.012
Immigration 1.50 0.133 0.27 0.788 0.18 0.855
Housing -1.05 0.292 3.29 0.001 3.60 0.001
DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty -0.75 0.454 -0.39 0.700 -0.34 0.738
DEP*Human Capital -0.32 0.746 -0.78 0.435 -0.79 0.432
DEP*Segregation 1.19 0.235 1.45 0.150 1.19 0.238
SEP*Supervision -0.12 0.908 -0.52 0.603 -0.45 0.654
DEP*Anonymity 1.05 0.292 -1.15 0.253 -1.81 0.072
DEP*Immigration -0.67 0.506 -1.18 0.238 -1.17 0.245
DEP*Housing 0.73 0.467 -0.53 0.596 -0.81 0.421
  Model Statistics:  -2LL -637.8 -314.20 -433.40
DEP Dummy DEP Investments DEP Components
Table 9b.  Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Property Crime Rates, New York City 
Police Precincts, 1986-96
 XXX]                            FAGAN, DAVIES AND HOLLAND                                           12 
Table 10.  Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Homicide Counts, New York City 
Census Tracts, 1985-96 
 DEP Binary  DEP Investment  DEP Components 
Effect t p(t)  t p(t)  t p(t) 
Intercept -38.46 0.000  -27.40 0.000  -26.34 0.000 
Time 15.33 0.000  4.33 0.000  1.29 0.197 
Time2 -14.59 0.000  -4.25 0.000  -1.25 0.213 
DEP -11.91 0.000  -6.16 0.000    
Operation Safe Homes       -4.50 0.000 
Tenant Patrols       1.23 0.219 
Public Housing Dummy -2.58 0.010  -1.75 0.080  -1.70 0.089 
Drug Arrests - Sale 3.59 0.000  2.73 0.006  2.62 0.009 
Drug Arrests - Possession 0.18 0.855  2.76 0.006  2.91 0.004 
Spatial Lag 12.17 0.000  12.85 0.000  12.68 0.000 
Endogeneity 14.45 0.000  22.97 0.000  22.53 0.000 
Population (Logged) 33.48 0.000  24.97 0.000  25.03 0.000 
Poverty 4.85 0.000  0.36 0.720  0.45 0.652 
Human Capital -1.52 0.128  -0.89 0.372  -0.82 0.412 
Segregation 15.76 0.000  8.44 0.000  8.55 0.000 
Social Control - Supervision 8.78 0.000  5.81 0.000  5.63 0.000 
Social Control - Anonymity -2.41 0.016  -0.93 0.350  -0.61 0.544 
Immigration -8.69 0.000  -4.30 0.000  -4.23 0.000 
Housing 3.60 0.000  2.71 0.007  2.57 0.010 
DEP Interactions         
     DEP*Poverty -1.45 0.148  0.09 0.926  -0.11 0.916 
     DEP*Human Capital -0.31 0.755  -0.02 0.988  -0.12 0.903 
     DEP*Segregation 0.86 0.389  -0.94 0.349  -1.15 0.252 
     DEP*Supervision 1.96 0.050  0.13 0.897  0.29 0.772 
     DEP*Anonymity 3.04 0.002  0.52 0.601  0.02 0.980 
     DEP*Immigration -0.70 0.482  -0.32 0.752  -0.19 0.846 
     DEP*Housing -0.02 0.987  -0.17 0.868  -0.03 0.978 
Model Statistics: -2LL 84199.0  38844.8  38813.2 
 
Effects t p(t) t p(t) t p(t)
Intercept -19.79 0.000 -12.85 0.000 -1.97 0.050
Time 0.80 0.427 2.14 0.033 -0.46 0.649
Time2 -2.30 0.021 -0.94 0.350 0.54 0.586
DEP 1.22 0.225 -0.08 0.933
Operation Safe Homes -0.52 0.606
Tenant Patrols -0.79 0.433
Drug Possession Arrests  (log) -1.68 0.092 -2.85 0.005 -2.95 0.003
Drug Sale Arrests (log) 3.40 0.001 0.34 0.735 0.28 0.783
Precinct Property Crime Rate 5.73 0.000 3.52 0.001 3.59 0.000
Endogeneity 9.24 0.000 8.70 0.000 8.70 0.000
PH Development Characteristics
Population (log) 33.55 0.000 28.97 0.000 28.86 0.000
Poverty 1.69 0.091 1.85 0.064 1.70 0.090
Supervision Ratio (Seniors/Minors) 11.38 0.000 2.73 0.007 2.86 0.005
Employed (2 or more persons in HH) -1.87 0.061 -0.41 0.685 -0.43 0.670
Tenure 2.71 0.007 -0.10 0.920 -0.01 0.990
Racial Heterogeneity -1.32 0.187 0.17 0.862 0.26 0.795
DEP Interactions
DEP * Poverty 2.30 0.022 0.86 0.391 0.92 0.359
DEP * Supervision -4.22 0.000 -0.76 0.446 -0.85 0.397
DEP * Employment -1.09 0.277 -0.32 0.748 -0.32 0.751
DEP * Tenure -0.69 0.493 0.51 0.611 0.45 0.650
DEP * Racial Fragmentation -1.40 0.163 -1.97 0.049 -1.98 0.049
Model Statistics: -2LL 2096.40 1393.7
Table 11a.  Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported Violent Crime Rates, NYCHA 
Developments, 1986-94
1393.7
DEP Binary DEP Investment DEP Components
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Table 11b.  Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported Property Crime Rate, NYCHA 
Developments, 1986-94 
 DEP Binary  DEP Investment  DEP Components 
Effects t p(t)  t p(t)  t p(t) 
Intercept -11.90 0.000  -9.38 0.000  -1.30 0.196 
Time 1.66 0.097  2.59 0.010  -0.09 0.927 
Time2 -9.41 0.000  -0.86 0.388  0.26 0.798 
DEP -1.38 0.168  -0.84 0.403    
Operation Safe Homes       -0.33 0.739 
Tenant Patrols       0.14 0.892 
Drug Possession Arrests  (log) 0.29 0.774  -1.25 0.213  -1.10 0.272 
Drug Sale Arrests (log) -0.28 0.781  -0.53 0.596  -0.49 0.625 
Precinct Property Crime Rate 0.00 0.999  -1.35 0.178  -1.38 0.168 
Endogeneity 8.47 0.000  6.84 0.000  6.87 0.000 
         
PH Development Characteristics         
Population (log) 29.61 0.000  25.45 0.000  25.55 0.000 
Poverty 2.75 0.006  2.90 0.004  3.02 0.003 
Supervision Ratio (Seniors/Minors) 3.08 0.002  -1.94 0.053  -2.10 0.037 
Employed (2 or more persons in HH) -3.39 0.001  0.68 0.499  0.70 0.485 
Tenure 0.55 0.581  -1.01 0.315  -1.10 0.273 
Racial Heterogeneity -4.73 0.000  0.66 0.508  0.65 0.517 
         
DEP Interactions         
DEP * Poverty 1.52 0.129  -1.02 0.310  -1.08 0.279 
DEP * Supervision -1.54 0.125  1.29 0.197  1.38 0.168 
DEP * Employment 0.98 0.328  -0.66 0.507  -0.68 0.496 
DEP * Tenure 1.05 0.292  -0.46 0.648  -0.41 0.683 
DEP * Racial Fragmebtation 1.83 0.068  -1.44 0.151  -1.48 0.140 
Model Statistics: -2LL 2523.2  1697.7  1676.3 
 
Table 12.  Summary of DEP Effects at Three Spatial Aggregations 
 DEP Binary  DEP Investment  DEP Components 
  t p(t)   t p(t)  t p(t) 
Police Precincts       
     Violent Crimes -5.55 0.000  -9.10 0.000    
Operation Safe Home       -13.36 0.000 
Tenant Patrols       1.94 0.057 
     Property Crimes -6.91 0.000  -11.19 0.000    
Operation Safe Home       -13.91 0.000 
Tenant Patrols       4.12 0.000 
         
Census Tracts         
     Homicide Victimizations -11.91 0.000  -6.16 0.000    
Operation Safe Home       -4.50 0.000 
Tenant Patrols       1.23 0.219 
         
Public Housing Developments         
     Violent Crimes 1.22 0.225  -0.08 0.933    
Operation Safe Home       -0.52 0.606 
Tenant Patrols       -0.79 0.433 
     Property Crimes -1.38 0.168  -0.84 0.403    
Operation Safe Home       -0.33 0.739 
Tenant Patrols       0.14 0.892 
                 
All models controlled for social and economic contexts, crime rates in surrounding areas, time (quadratic), and interactions 
of DEP indicator with contextual factors    
 
